Two common approaches to defining "physicalism" are the theory-based and object-based approaches. įrom the notion of supervenience, it can be seen that, assuming that mental, social, and biological properties supervene on physical properties, two hypothetical worlds cannot be identical in their physical properties but differ in their mental, social or biological properties. It is therefore compatible with multiple realizability. Also, physicalism defined in terms of supervenience does not entail that all properties in the actual world are type identical to physical properties. The point of this extension is that physicalists usually suppose the existence of various abstract concepts which are non-physical in the ordinary sense of the word so physicalism cannot be defined in a way that denies the existence of these abstractions. Since any change in a combination of properties must consist of a change in at least one component property, we see that the combination does indeed supervene on the individual properties. It is common to express the notion of "metaphysical or logical combination of properties" using the notion of supervenience: A property A is said to supervene on a property B if any change in A necessarily implies a change in B. A "physical property", in this context, may be a metaphysical or logical combination of properties which are physical in the ordinary sense. The use of "physical" in physicalism is a philosophical concept and can be distinguished from alternative definitions found in the literature (e.g., Karl Popper defined a physical proposition as one that can at least in theory be denied by observation ). The word "physicalism" was introduced into philosophy in the 1930s by Otto Neurath and Rudolf Carnap. Outside of philosophy, physicalism can also refer to the preference or viewpoint that physics should be considered the best and only way to render truth about the world or reality. The philosophical zombie argument is another attempt to challenge physicalism. Neuroplasticity has been used as an argument in support of a non-physicalist view. Īccording to a 2009 survey, physicalism is the majority view among philosophers, but there remains significant opposition to physicalism. From a physicalist perspective, even abstract concepts such as mathematics, morality, consciousness, intentionality, and meaning are considered physical entities, although they may consist of a large ontological object and a causally complex structure. Physicalism encompasses matter, but also energy, physical laws, space, time, structure, physical processes, information, state, and forces, among other things, as described by physics and other sciences, as part of the physical in a monistic sense. The terms "physicalism" and "materialism" are often used interchangeably, but can be distinguished based on their philosophical implications. Physicalism is closely related to materialism, and has evolved from materialism with advancements in the physical sciences in explaining observed phenomena. Both the definition of "physical" and the meaning of physicalism have been debated. Physicalism is a form of ontological monism-a "one substance" view of the nature of reality as opposed to a "two-substance" ( dualism) or "many-substance" ( pluralism) view. In philosophy, physicalism is the metaphysical thesis that "everything is physical", that there is "nothing over and above" the physical, or that everything supervenes on the physical. Metaphysical thesis that everything is physical
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